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Theo A. F. Kuipers 
LOGICS OF SCIENTIFIC COGNITION 
REPLY TO JOHAN VAN BENTHEM 
In brainstorming about a suitable title for the present book the editors pondered 
over “Logics of Scientific Cognition.” For some reason this title did not make 
it, but Johan van Benthem’s contribution would have fitted that description 
perfectly. It breathes the same flexible spirit that was already present in his 
review-like programmatic paper “The Logical Study of Science” (Van 
Benthem 1982) and that seems to me essential for the very idea of confronting 
logic and philosophy of science. As also mentioned in my reply to Batens, 
unfortunately for philosophy of science, after 1982, with a few exceptions (e.g. 
Van Benthem 1987), Van Benthem directed his logical skills mainly to a 
number of other areas of the application of logic, notably informatics, 
linguistics and the philosophy of nature, in particular the logic of time. It is to 
be hoped that his present contribution is a sign of a partial return to philosophy 
of science. 
In this reply to Van Benthem I start with a number of miscellaneous 
remarks that cropped up when reading his Sections 2 and 3.2. I shall then 
indicate that the notion of “partial theory” propagated by him in Section 3.3 
not only seems to be directly useful for a couple of interesting topics in the 
philosophy of science. It has also some resemblance to an interesting special 
type of theory that I have called “partition theory” (Kuipers 1982). One reason 
for not dealing with Van Benthem’s Sections 4 and 5 is to challenge him, his 
colleagues and his students to really cross the threshold and to reside for a 
substantial time in the philosophy of science. There is really much interesting 
work to do for the mutual benefit of philosophy of science and logic. For this 
general theme, see also a few other replies in this volume, notably to Aliseda, 
Meheus, Batens, Zwart, Mormann, and Burger and Heidema, and in the 
companion volume those to Kamps and Ruttkamp. 
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Miscellaneous Remarks 
On Section 2.1: Theory Formats 
(1) Van Benthem states that in ordinary reasoning theorizing about (using the 
terms of my reply to Sjoerd Zwart) one intended application and a class of 
intended applications may play together. I would like to emphasize that 
precisely the same applies in the theory-experiment interplay in science (ICR, 
Section 7.3, briefly indicated in Van Benthem’s Section 3.2). In experimental 
contexts we try to establish by “actual truth approximation,” given a 
vocabulary, the true description (or theory, if you like) of one experiment, that 
is, its set-up, initial conditions, and the outcome. By “nomic truth 
approximation” we try to approach the strongest true theory of what is 
physically possible, that is, the set of physical or nomic possibilities, using the 
results of (attempts at) actual truth approximation with regard to experiments, 
including inductive leaps based on them.
(2) Van Benthem rightly notes that by defining theories as sets of models, and, 
I should add, hence also by conceiving theories as deductively closed sets of 
statements, one “loses the packaging into chunks in which the information was 
presented.” The modern definitions of theories he is hinting at by MOD+(T)
may be very useful for localizing possible causes for counterexamples to 
theories, and hence for theory revision in favor of closer-to-the-truth ones in 
the basic sense of ICR. This is a fortiori the case when information chunks are 
ordered. By quoting from SiS, I would like to stress that in the philosophy of 
science very nice, partially computational, work in this direction has already 
been done: 
Finally, Darden [1990] considers the solution of an anomaly of a theory as a task for 
diagnostic reasoning, which has been developed for expert systems, guided by the tracing 
of a defect in a technical system. She shows, using Mendelian examples (see also Darden 
(1991)), that the decomposition of all presuppositions of a theory may provide the points 
of departure for solving the anomaly, and that its solution, as in Lakatos’ famous analysis 
(1976), may or may not lead to fundamental theory revision, that is, a revision staying 
within a research program or breaking through the barriers of the relevant program. (SiS, 
p. 301). 
On Section 2.2: Information Update 
(3) I shall return later to the claim that “information update proceeds by 
elimination of possibilities.” Here I just want to note that the party illustration 
of “elimination of possibilities,” in the sense of possible models, typically 
amounts to actual truth approximation by applying given general facts, where 
the latter happen to be, in conjunction, so strong that they leave only room for 
one final possibility. That is, relative to the given language, an incomplete true 
Theo A. F. Kuipers 422
description is extended to the complete true one by eliminating all the other 
ones. By leaving out at least one such general fact and adding an initial 
condition, we obtain formal analogues of actual truth approximation as it 
occurs in the HD prediction and DN explanation of individual facts. These 
types of actual truth approximation are essentially contained in the general 
approach to propositional languages presented in (Kuipers 1982, Section 4). 
This general approach also covers another special case: actual truth 
approximation by successive corrections of a provisional description of a 
certain situation, whether that situation is realized by nature or by experiment. 
Only this special case is also presented in ICR (Section 7.3.1). 
Moreover, they differ from “nomic truth approximation” by the interplay of 
realized possibilities and established empirical laws. The crucial reason for the 
latter is that in all variants of actual truth approximation there is, by definition, 
one target model, whereas a set of models is the target in the case of nomic 
truth approximation. More generally, the target is a set in all cases in which we 
want to establish a certain constellation of possibilities, which happens to be 
interesting for one reason or another. To mention just one social science 
example, consider an anthropologist who wants to establish in some way or 
other “the true moral theory” holding in some society and who has as his target 
the largest set of “morally allowed actions,” of which we may hope that it is 
far greater than one. Note that all mentioned types of truth approximation can 
formally be illustrated by playing with the party example as well as by my 
favorite electric circuit example. 
(4) Regarding “many-agent dynamics of update in communication” I just 
quote a passage from SiS: 
Moreover, Thagard [1988] suggests that we consider and simulate a scientific community 
as a collection of interacting parallel computational systems. Here the idea of social 
adequacy comes into the picture. The suggested analogy raises the question of the 
possibility and the desirability of a further division of labor than the well-known one 
between theoreticians and experimenters. In this connection he thinks in particular of the 
division of labor between ‘constructive dogmatists’ and ‘skeptical critics’, to use our 
favorite terms for what is essentially the same idea. (SiS, p. 299). 
On Section 3.2: Theories in Progress 
(5) By calling R “the result of experimental verifications” van Benthem 
suggested to me a new explication of the fact that scientists frequently talk 
about “verification,” where philosophers of science prefer to be more cautious 
and merely talk about “confirmation.” However, in view of the logical relation 
between ‘the strongest true theory’ T and one of its models, it is on closer 
inspection perfectly reasonable to say that the model m that truly characterizes 
a realized possibility, verifies T, by its definition in terms of nomic 
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possibilities. Similarly, it verifies any theory X that has m as one of its models. 
In both cases, just because T and X, respectively, are true on that model. Of 
course, it would be totally wrong to conclude, for example, that theory X has 
then been verified in the relevant general sense. 
Hence, it might make sense to speak of verification of a theory by a model 
in contrast to general or overall verification of a theory. Note that this point is 
directly related to Emma Ruttkamp’s observation that theories are frequently 
overdetermined by the data, instead of underdetermined (see Ruttkamp 2000, 
her contribution to the companion volume, and my reply).
According to this sense of verification of a theory by a model, an 
“actualized model” (in the sense of an actualized conceptual possibility) 
compatible with the theory verifies it. More roughly: a “positive instance” and 
even a “neutral instance” (see below) of the theory verify it. Hence, a theory 
can be – at the same time – verified by some models (instances) and falsified 
by others. This new sense of verification perfectly shows the non-standard way 
in which I use the term ‘model’. See the synopsis’ introduction to Part III and 
my reply to Zwart. The main interest of the new sense of verification may even 
be restricted to just revealing my non-standard use of the term ‘model’. 
Note too that the verification of a theory by a model need not imply that we 
have a confirming instance or model of the theory in the sense of deductive 
confirmation, discussed in ICR Ch. 2, for the relevant model may be a neutral 
instance. For example, although both a black raven and non-black non-raven 
are “verifying and confirming” models of “all ravens are black,” a black non-
raven is a “verifying but not confirming” model of that hypothesis. This 
amounts to similar reasons to those in the case of verification in the general 
sense (as treated in ICR, Ch. 2, pp. 21-2) for not conceiving “verification” 
simply as an extreme, viz. maximal, form of “confirmation,” as is usually done 
by philosophers of science.
(6) As announced, I come back to van Benthem’s claim in 2.2 that 
“information update proceeds by elimination of possibilities.” In 3.2 this is 
rightly qualified by “we also eliminate potential laws by adding models.” 
Indeed, in addition to my favorite dual formulations of ‘more successful’ and 
‘more truthlike’ in terms of consequences and models (ICR, p.182, p.189), we 
get in this way also a “dual formulation” of updating the data R(t) and S(t).
They are updated to a superset R(t') and subset S(t'), respectively, for t' later 
than t, by eliminating potential laws and possibilities, respectively. Of course, 
conversely, there is also a dual formulation in terms of “addition” (or 
“introduction”): adding new possibilities and laws, respectively. 
(7) Van Benthem plausibly distinguishes between necessary and sufficient 
conditions for satisfying, for example, a certain theory. Moreover, he suggests 
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that the latter form is more appropriate when one concludes that “a whole class 
of systems  say, all pendulums in a certain range” falls under a physical 
theory. Although this way of speaking is not false, it may be still more 
appropriate to conceptualize this as a case of domain change, in particular 
domain narrowing, and hence change, in particular strengthening, of the 
relevant truth. For the topic of truth approximation by domain change, see my 
reply to Sjoerd Zwart. 
Partial Theories and Partition Theories 
From my point of view two intuitions come together in the notion of a “partial 
theory.” First, the three-valued division of objects, for example of models, into 
a positive, a negative and a, so far, grey or neutral extension. Second, 
(epistemological) symmetry in the sense that “negative instances” are known in 
the same way as “positive instances.” Both aspects are very important, but they 
need not go together.
Partition Theories 
Let me first turn to “two-valued” epistemically symmetric theories. I have 
(only) paid special attention to them in my first paper on truth approximation 
(Kuipers 1982, Section 7.2, pp. 368-371), where I called them “partition 
theories,” for reasons that will soon become clear. Take an electric circuit with 
just one bulb and some network of switches. We can immediately assume, for 
good reasons, that the true theory about the circuit is of the following type: the 
bulb will light if and only if a certain complex condition for the on and off 
state of the switches holds. Hence, whereas we may suppose that all 
conceptually possible switch states are physically possible, they are 
partitioned into two sets, viz. switch states with and without a lit bulb. When 
we propose a theory for the circuit, we can restrict ourselves to theories of the 
same form, which hence also partition the set of switch states into two subsets. 
As a consequence, such a theory can have two types of real counterexamples. 
A lit bulb and a switch state that does not satisfy the theory’s condition and a 
non-lit bulb and a switch state that does satisfy the condition. The same feature 
occurs in many other, more interesting, cases. For example, equilibrium 
theories in physics and economics. The true theory about a balance and hence 
candidate theories are of the form: the balance is in equilibrium if and only if 
…. A quite different example is a grammatical theory. Such a theory is also of 
the form: a sentence is grammatical, as judged by native speakers, if and only 
if it satisfies such and such conditions. Hence, a grammatical sentence not
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satisfying the theory’s condition is a counter-example, but an ungrammatical
sentence satisfying the condition is one, too.
In the rest of Section 7.2 of (Kuipers 1982) ‘more truthlike’ and ‘more 
successful’ of partition theories is elaborated, where useful, deviating from the 
way this is done for theories in general. Taking two types of real 
counterexamples into account turns out to be less complex than one might 
expect, even less complex than for theories in general, in which case only one 
type has to be taken into account. The reason is of course that for theories in 
general we have also to take a kind of virtual counterexamples into account. 
Recall that R(t) represents the realized, or established real or nomic,
possibilities at time t and S(t) the, on their basis, strongest established law at t.
The complement of S(t) can be said to represent “virtual impossibilities.” 
Hence, whereas R(t)  X represents the established real counterexamples of 
theory X, X  S(t) represents the established virtual counterexamples. The 
asymmetric role attributed to R(t) and S(t) in ICR has everything to do with the 
special nature of virtual impossibilities and virtual counterexamples. Of 
course, in some sense, partition theories also have virtual counterexamples. 
The point is that they are now implicitly represented by real counterexamples. 
For, to each real counterexample, e.g. a lit bulb with improper switch 
condition, corresponds a virtual counterexample, e.g. a (non-defective) non-lit 
bulb in the same switch state.
To be sure, although partition theories frequently occur in the empirical 
sciences, it is by no means the case that other theories can be missed. On the 
contrary, in my opinion, the great variety of “empirical laws” implies that as a 
rule we have to take virtual impossibilities explicitly into account. Only in 
rather special cases may we have good reasons to suppress them.
Partial Theories 
The idea of partial theories, whether or not with a partitioning character in the 
sense above, does indeed seem to be very useful for philosophy of science 
purposes. Let me start by indicating how it could refine the general (meta-) 
theories of confirmation, empirical progress, and truth approximation as 
presented in ICR. As a matter of fact, ICR and remark (5) above, already 
contain several indications in this direction. Realized examples of a theory X,
that is, members of R(t)  X, may be of two kinds. X may or may not have 
some conditional deductive consequence for a member, that is, there may or 
may not be some partial description of that member for which X entails the rest 
of the (complete) true description. For confirmation theory, this leads to the 
distinction between “neutral evidence” (recall the black non-raven for “all 
ravens are black”) and (genuine) “confirming evidence” (a black raven as well 
as a non-black non-raven), see ICR, e.g. pp. 27-8. Moreover, for the theory of 
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empirical progress it leads to the symmetric evaluation matrix, according to 
which, besides negative and positive results, neutral results have to be taken 
into account when comparing theories (ICR, p. 117). Finally, for the theory of 
truth approximation and in particular for the definition of ‘more truthlike’ it 
would lead to a distinction between types of “correct models,” e.g. something 
like “positive models” and “neutral models,” besides “negative models” of the 
theory.
As suggested, ICR contains hints with respect to the implementation of the 
partial character of empirical theories in the first two meta-theories, that is, 
about confirmation and empirical progress. However, I must confess that I am 
not sure to what extent I in fact assume in these hints that the empirical 
theories also are of a partitioning nature. Be this as it may, ICR does not 
contain hints for implementing “partiality” in the theory of truth 
approximation. Van Benthem’s proposal at the end of Section 3.3 for this 
purpose, taking “neutral models” implicitly into account, seems very plausible. 
The overall “model nature” of that definition suggests that it will nicely 
combine with a similar overall model formulation of “more successful.” 
However, such a formulation will very naturally reflect the success 
comparison of partition theories, by suppressing virtual counterexamples. 
Hence, an interesting challenge seems to be to give dual formulations for both 
‘more successful’ and ‘more truthlike’ of partial theories in general. But I 
would also not exclude the possibility that, on closer inspection, the dual 
formulations in ICR of both, which prima facie neglect the indicated partial 
character of theories, already take this character implicitly into account. 
I would like to conclude with a straightforward example of partial 
predicates with a partitioning character. In SiS (Ch. 10) I show that there is a 
partial analogy between truth approximation and design research. In particular, 
in the most naïve representation, it is plausible to explicate the idea that a new 
prototype is an improvement of an old one in view of a set of desired 
properties (SiS, p. 270) in formally the same “symmetric difference” way as 
being “more truthlike.” The set of desired or wished for properties W is here 
supposed to be a subset of a given set RP of “relevant properties.” To be 
precise, RP does not contain the equally relevant “counterpart properties,” that 
is, if RP contains P, it does not contain not-P. Moreover, RP-W is supposed to 
represent the set of undesired properties. In this set-up a prototype is 
partitioning in the sense that ‘not having a desired property’ may be assumed 
to be equally easy (or difficult) to establish experimentally as ‘having an 
undesired property’.
One plausible refinement results when one withdraws the assumption that a 
property that is not desired is automatically undesired. This results in the 
division of (the potentially relevant) properties into three categories; say, 
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desired, indifferent and undesired properties, denoted by W+, I and W. This 
may be particularly useful in view of later possibilities to negotiate again about 
W+. As long as prototypes are merely described by their properties, the 
minimal condition of being an improvement is of course that the new 
prototype has all the desired properties the old one has and the old one has all 
undesired properties the new one has (SiS, p. 280). However, changing the 
topic to the market of end products, producers may each have used their own 
W+/I/W division, and may even have succeeded in realizing products 
‘between their W+ and W’. A consumer will have his own W+/I/ W division. 
For judging whether he should prefer one of the products over the other, he 
may well use Van Benthem’s formal definition, at the end of Section 3.3, 
assuming that he wants to take the intentions of the producers into account. If 
he does not want to do so, as we may normally expect, he is well advised just 
to use the minimal condition mentioned above. Hence, our full-blown partial 
example remains rather artificial, but suggests at the same time that it will be 
possible to find more realistic examples. 
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